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Ultimate ownership structure and corporate disclosure quality:
Evidence from China

Abstract
Purpose – This study examines whether the type of ultimate controllers (i.e., private vs.
state) affects corporate disclosure quality and whether the relationship between the type
of ultimate controllers and corporate disclosure quality is moderated by the separation of
ownership and control.
Design/methodology/approach – This study employs the data of 405 Chinese listed
firms in 2005. We review annual reports to collect the data including the type of ultimate
owners, cash-flow rights, and control rights. We also collect the rating of corporate
disclosure quality from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange website. We run the ordered
logistic regression to test the hypotheses.
Findings – We find that corporate disclosure quality is lower for firms ultimately
controlled by individuals than for firms ultimately controlled by the state. We also
document that the negative effect of private ultimate ownership on corporate disclosure
quality is stronger for firms with high deviation of cash-flow rights and control rights.
Practical Implications – Our findings suggest that privatizing state-owned companies
may increase the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders if the
privatization does not reduce the separation of cash-flow rights from control rights. Thus,
it may be necessary to strengthen the governance role of minority shareholders and
constrain the divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights of the ultimate
owners when state-owned companies are privatized.
Originality/value – This study contributes to the literature on the expropriation of
minority shareholders by examining the main effect of the type of ultimate controllers
and the interactive effect of ultimate ownership type and the divergence of ownership and
control on corporate disclosure quality.
Keywords Ownership, Control, Private owners, State, Corporate disclosure.
Paper type Research paper
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1.

Introduction

Extant research (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishney,
1988; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002) suggests that there exist both incentive
and entrenchment effects of highly concentrated ownership. On the one hand, controlling
ownership may mitigate the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers
because large shareholders may effectively monitor managers (Shleifer and Vishny,
1986). On the other hand, large ownership may increase the conflicts of interest between
controlling and minority shareholders as large shareholders may behave in their own
interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Recently, the costs of large shareholding are highlighted by a stream of research
that examines the expropriation of minority shareholders and associated corporate
governance issues arising from the separation of ultimate controlling shareholders’ cashflow rights (i.e., ownership) from their control rights (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances,
and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and
Lang, 2002; Fan and Wong, 2002; Haw, Hu, Hwang, and Wu, 2004; Attig, Fong,
Gadhoum, and Lang, 2006). When ultimate controllers’ ownership is lower than their
control (voting) rights, they are more likely to expropriate minority shareholders because
the expropriation is less restrained by their own cash-flow stake (Attig et al., 2006).
More recently, using Chinese listed firms’ loan guarantees to related parties as a
proxy for expropriation, Berkman, Cole, and Fu (2009) find that firms with state noncorporate controlling block holders are less likely to issue related guarantees than other
firms.1 Their findings imply that the expropriation of minority shareholders may be less
for firms ultimately controlled by the state than by private owners. Berkman et al. (2009)
argue that the state may be less motivated to expropriate minority shareholders than
private owners since the monetary benefits from expropriation can be captured more
easily and directly by private owners than by bureaucrats running a government entity.
However, there is limited research in the literature to address this issue. Moreover, this
issue is important because it relates to the costs and benefits of privatizing state-owned
companies. Thus, it is warranted to investigate whether the type of ultimate controllers
(state vs. private) affects the expropriation of minority shareholders.
To shed light on this question, this study examines whether the type of ultimate
controllers affects corporate disclosure quality and whether the effect of the type of
ultimate controllers is moderated by the deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights.
We are interested in corporate disclosure quality because it well reflects corporate
governance quality. Controlling owners who expropriate minority shareholders are more
likely to obscure and delay the disclosure of related information and manipulate
accounting numbers to hide the adverse effect of their expropriation on firm performance.
To do so, those owners may execute their influence over board of directors to impair
monitoring mechanisms. Thus, the expropriation of minority shareholders may lead to
lower corporate governance quality, and then lower corporate disclosure quality.
This study focuses on the Chinese data for the following reasons: (1) Chinese listed
companies have high ownership concentration, (2) a high proportion of Chinese listed
companies are ultimately controlled by the state, and (3) Chinese listed companies are
1

required to disclose information about the ultimate ownership structure in annual reports.
Using a sample of 405 listed firms across 22 industries in 2005 and the rating of
corporate disclosure quality issued by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, we find that
corporate disclosure quality is lower for firms with private ultimate owners than for firms
with state ultimate owners. We also find that the negative effect of private ultimate
ownership on corporate disclosure quality is stronger when the deviation of cash-flow
rights from control rights is large. Our findings suggest that private ultimate owners are
more likely to expropriate minority shareholders than state ultimate owners, especially
when cash-flow rights are highly separated from control rights.
This study contributes to the literature as follows. First, our study extends a
growing corporate governance research on the expropriation of minority shareholders.
Unlike prior research that focuses on the main effect of the separation of ownership from
control (Claessens et al., 2000; Fan and Wong, 2002; Attig et al., 2006), this study
focuses on the effects of ultimate controllers’ type on corporate governance issues arising
from the divergence of ownership and control. It is important to examine whether the
entrenchment costs incurred by large shareholdings are higher for private-controlled
firms than for state-controlled firms because it can provide implications for the costs and
benefits of privatizing state-owned companies.
Second, this study adds to the extant limited accounting literature on the
relationship between minority shareholders’ expropriation and financial reporting quality.
Unlike existing studies by Fan and Wong (2002) and Haw et al. (2004) that measure
financial reporting quality by earnings-return relation and discretionary accruals and use
cross-country data, our study employs a more comprehensive measure of financial
reporting quality and associated corporate governance. Moreover, focusing on a
country’s data in our study can avoid the potential confounding effects due to different
country-level institutional infrastructures.
Third, this study enriches the literature on corporate disclosure quality. Although
there is a large body of research that examines the association between corporate
disclosure quality and corporate governance (e.g., Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta, 2005;
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first one to
investigate the relationship among corporate disclosure quality, the type of ultimate
ownership, and the divergence of cash-flow rights and control rights.
Fourth, this study also evaluates the credibility and usefulness of the rating of
corporate disclosure quality issued by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. To the best of our
knowledge, our study is the first one to provide empirical evidence on assessing the
rating. Our findings provide an implication to investors, Chinese securities regulators
and stock exchanges, that the Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s rating is credible and useful.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
institutional background. Section 3 reviews the literature. Section 4 develops
hypotheses. Section 5 discusses the methodology. Section 6 presents empirical results.
Section 7 concludes.
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2.

Institutional background

With the original intention of raising capital for state-owned enterprises from the
public, China reopened its stock markets in the early 1990s. Thus, most Chinese listed
companies originated from state-owned companies. The listed companies are mandated
to have three different classes of shares, i.e., state-owned shares, legal person shares, and
individual shares. State-owned shares are held by the central, provincial, or municipal
governments. Legal person shares are owned by legal entities including domestic or
foreign enterprises and institutions. Individual shares are publicly issued to individual
persons. Obviously, state-owned shares and individual shares are ultimately owned by
the state and private investors, respectively, but legal person shares could be ultimately
held by either the state or individual persons.
Unlike corporate disclosure environments in other countries, corporate disclosure
of Chinese listed companies has been highly regulated by the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC), a government agency that officially enacts the regulations of the
Chinese securities markets. Based on the corporate disclosure requirements of the CSRC,
listed companies should disclose information in annual reports including company
background, summary of operating results, directors’ report, financial statements,
material events, related companies, etc. The annual reports have the similar content and
format for all listed companies. Since corporate disclosure is highly mandated, there is
scarce room for Chinese listed companies to make voluntary disclosure. The special
feature of the Chinese corporate disclosure environment indicates that it is vital for
researchers to allow for extensive and multi-dimensional measures that can reflect the
overall quality rather than only a single aspect of corporate disclosure.
3.

Literature review

There is a growing literature that examines the expropriation of minority
shareholders by ultimate controllers. La Porta et al. (1999) investigate ownership
structures of companies from 27 countries. They find that few of the firms are widely
held except in countries with strong investor protection. They also find that ultimate
owners typically use superior voting rights to exercise control over the firms even when
they have limited ownership. Claessens et al. (2000) examine the deviation of cash-flow
rights and control rights in nine East Asian countries. They find that family-controlled
firms and small firms have a large separation of ownership and control, and that
managers of family-controlled firms are more likely to be the relatives of the family.
These two studies suggest that the ownership structure of firms facilitates controlling
shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. More explicitly, Claessens et al.
(2002) document that firm value decreases in the deviation of cash-flow rights and
control rights, consistent with the entrenchment effect of large shareholdings.
Recently, Berkman et al. (2009) find that firms with state non-corporate
controllers are less likely to issue loan guarantees to related parties than other firms in
China, suggesting that state controllers are less likely to expropriate minority
shareholders than private controllers. Chen, Firth, and Xu (2009) compare performance
3

of Chinese listed firms with different types of controllers. They find that private
controlled firms perform worse than state-owned firms affiliated to the central
government, and argue that private controllers may expropriate the income and assets of
their firms away from minority shareholders. Wu, Xu, and Yuan (2009) examine
whether the type of controllers affects the relationship between ownership concentration
and legal investor protection in China. They find that an inverse relationship between
ownership concentration and legal investor protection exists only for firms with private
controllers but not for firms with state controllers, suggesting that state controlling serves
as a substitute to legal investor protection.
There are several extant studies that investigate the effects of the separation of
cash-flow rights from control rights on financial reporting quality and corporate
information environment. Fan and Wong (2002) examine the association between
earnings-return relation and ownership structure for a sample of 977 firms in seven East
Asian countries.2 They find that earnings-return relation is lower for firms with a high
divergence between the ultimate owner’s cash-flow rights and control rights. Haw et al.
(2004) examine the relationship between ultimate ownership structure and income
management in nine East Asian and thirteen Western European countries.3 They find that
income management is positively associated with the detachment of cash-flow rights
from control rights of ultimate owners, and that this association is less pronounced in
countries with high statutory protection of minority rights and effective extra-legal
institutions. These two studies suggest that the ultimate ownership affects earnings
quality. Attig et al. (2006) examine whether the deviation of ownership and control
rights is associated with information asymmetry and stock liquidity. They find that firms
with a high separation of cash-flow rights and control rights have a greater information
asymmetry component of their bid-ask spread and a wider quoted bid-ask spread,
suggesting that the ultimate ownership structure affects corporate information
environment.
Prior research also suggests that corporate disclosure can reflect corporate
governance quality. Using the U.S. data, Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that the occurrence of
management earnings forecasts is positively associated with board independence, a proxy
for board governance quality. They also document that management earnings forecasts
are more accurate and less optimistically biased for firms with greater board
independence, and that firms with greater institutional ownership are less likely to issue
management earnings forecasts. Moreover, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find that
managers are more likely to issue or update earnings forecasts when firms have more
effective board and audit committee structures in U.S.
4.

Hypotheses

Prior research suggests that agency costs may arise from highly concentrated
ownership. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1999) argue that high
ownership concentration leads to the conflicts of interest between large and small
shareholders. As large shareholders effectively control corporations, they are likely to
expropriate the interest of minority shareholders. For instance, controlling shareholders
4

can benefit themselves by not paying out dividends, or by transferring profits to other
firms under their control. Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) develop a theoretical
model that suggests an ex ante expropriation threat of tight control of large shareholders
on small shareholders.
Prior literature further suggests that a likely effect of expropriating minority
shareholders is that the information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and
minority shareholders may increase (Attig et al., 2006). When controlling shareholders
enrich themselves by executing corporate projects at the expense of minority interest,
they are likely to obscure and delay the disclosure of related information. Thus, less
relevant and adequate information will be disclosed when ultimate owners use their
control rights to extract rent from minority shareholders. As a result, minority
shareholders would not have adequate information to timely intervene and scrutinize
those projects. Controlling owners may manipulate accounting numbers to hide the
adverse effect of their expropriation on firm performance. Hence, controlling owners are
likely to execute influence over board of directors and then impair monitoring
mechanisms, resulting in low corporate disclosure quality.4
Berkman et al. (2009) use Chinese listed firms’ loan guarantees to related parties as
a proxy for expropriation, and find that related guarantees are less likely to be issued by
firms with state non-corporate controlling block holders than by other firms. This
suggests that private controllers may be more motivated to expropriate minority
shareholders than the state because the monetary benefits from expropriation can be
captured more easily and directly by private owners than by bureaucrats running a
government entity. Chen, Firth, and Xu (2009) argue that it is easier for private
controllers to expropriate the income and assets of Chinese listed firms away from
minority shareholders because private controllers are not subject to monitoring by the
state. As a result, the entrenchment effect of large shareholdings is higher for firms
ultimately controlled by private owners than by the state. Thus, we hypothesize that
corporate disclosure quality is lower for private-controlled firms than for state-controlled
firms. The first hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H1:
Corporate disclosure quality is lower for firms ultimately controlled by private
owners than for firms ultimately controlled by the state.
Prior research (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999) also suggests that the conflicts of interest
between large and small shareholders are more pronounced when control rights of
ultimate owners exceed their cash-flow rights. Large shareholders whose control rights
are greater than their cash-flow rights may have greater incentives to extract value from
minority shareholders because this expropriation is less restrained by controlling
shareholders’ own cash-flow stake. Claessens et al. (2002) document evidence that a
deviation of ownership from control rights is negatively associated with market valuation,
suggesting that the deviation leads to agency costs and thus decreases firm value.
Ultimate owners seem to behave more selfishly when there is a discrepancy between
control rights and cash-flow rights. Firms with a separation of ownership from control
are likely to have more agency problems. Thus, the negative effect of private ultimate
ownership on corporate disclosure quality may be stronger for firms with high divergence
5

between control rights and cash-flow rights. We develop the second hypothesis as
follows:
H2:
The negative effect of private ultimate ownership on corporate disclosure quality
is stronger for firms with large deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights than for
firms with small deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights.
5.

Methodology

5.1.

Ultimate ownership structure
We use Chinese data in this study because the ownership of publicly traded firms
is highly concentrated in China.5 Moreover, the legal enforcement for protecting
minority shareholders seems weak in China (Cai, 2007). As many Chinese listed
companies are ultimately controlled by the state, focusing on Chinese data may increase
the power of testing our hypotheses. More importantly, as required by the CSRC,
Chinese publicly traded firms have started to disclose information about ultimate
controlling shareholders in annual reports since 2001, thus providing us a unique
opportunity to easily and clearly identify ultimate owners. Methodologically, focusing on
one country’s data can avoid country-level effects that may confound previous studies
using cross-country data (Fan and Wong, 2002; Haw et al., 2004).6
Ultimate owners are those who have voting rights in the firm and who are not
controlled by anyone else. In China, the ultimate owner usually controls the listed
company through a pyramidal structure in which at least one company lies between the
ultimate owner and the downstream listed company. For Chinese publicly traded firms,
information about the ultimate owner of the largest shareholder is mandatorily released in
their annual reports. Thus, we are able to identify the ultimate owner even though the
largest shareholder of a listed company is not a publicly traded company.7 Based on the
information disclosed in annual reports, we can determine whether the ultimate controller
is a private owner or the state.
Following prior research (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2002), we
identify the separation of cash-flow rights from control rights based on information about
ownership and control contained in Chinese annual reports. For example, State-Owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Shenzhen Municipal Government
(SASACSMG) owns 100% of Shenzhen Construction Investment Holding Company,
which is the largest shareholder and owns 34.8% of Shenzhen Changcheng Investment
Holding. Co., Ltd., a company listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In this example,
the ultimate owner is the state as SASACSMG is a government agency. The ultimate
shareholder owns 34.8% of both control rights and cash-flow rights (i.e., 34.8% × 100%)
of Shenzhen Changcheng Investment Holding. Co., Ltd. The equality of control rights to
cash-flow rights of the ultimate controlling owner indicates no separation of cash-flow
rights from control rights for this company. For another company listed on the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange, Shenzhen SEG. Dashang Co., Ltd is owned 28% by its largest
shareholder, Guangzhou Bouhong Investment Co. Ltd, which is owned 50% by its largest
shareholder, Chengbi Li, who is an individual person. Thus, the ultimate owner of this
listed company is a private owner, who owns 28% of the control rights and 14% (i.e.,
6

28% × 50%) of the cash-flow rights, indicating a separation of cash-flow rights from
control rights. Like prior research (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000; Fan and Wong, 2002;
Haw et al., 2004), we measure the deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights by the
ratio of cash-flow rights to control rights, which is lower if cash-flow rights are highly
detached from control rights.
5.2.

Rating of corporate disclosure quality
We use the annual rating issued by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange to measure the
quality of corporate disclosure for Chinese listed companies. The Shenzhen Stock
Exchange began to assess the quality of information disclosure for listed firms since the
fiscal year of 2001.8 The assessment is based on information disclosure activities
engaged by listed firms during a fiscal year. The rating is classified into four categories
including “Excellent”, “Good”, “Fair”, and “Poor”, for which we code “3”, “2”, “1”, and
“0”, respectively, as the value of the dependent variable in our regression model, i.e.,
corporate disclosure quality.
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange rates each listed firm critically on the basis of four
information disclosure quality attributes: timeliness, precision, completeness, and
compliance. The timeliness of information disclosure reflects how timely periodic or
transitory corporate disclosure reports are issued. The precision of information disclosure
measures whether the disclosure is succinct and clear, and whether the disclosure is
confused, misleading, and fraudulent. The completeness of information disclosure
indicates whether information is fully disclosed or lack of disclosure. The compliance of
information disclosure reveals the extent to which the disclosure is compliant with the
requirements stipulated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In addition to the above four attributes, each firm is also
assessed on how quickly it replies to the Exchange’s inquiring, whether board of directors
urges the firm to disclose in ways required by the Exchange, and whether the firm
communicates information to the Exchange when irregular situations occur. The rating
also considers whether and how many times a listed firm has received award or penalty
from the China Securities Regulatory Commission or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
Overall, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange provides an extensive and multidimensional measure of corporate disclosure quality, which well reflects corporate
governance quality of listed companies. To ensure the appropriateness of using this
rating as a proxy for corporate disclosure quality, we will empirically evaluate the
credibility and usefulness of the rating in the later text.
5.3.

Regression analysis
First, we evaluate the rating of corporate disclosure quality issued by the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange by estimating the following OLS regression model:
RET = β0 + β1 DISQ+ β2 EARN + β3 DISC*EARN + ε
(1)
where
RET = stock return, computed as the annual stock return including dividends,
DISQ = corporate disclosure quality, coded “3”, “2”, “1”, and “0” for the quality
rating of “Excellent”, “Good”, “Fair”, and “Poor” issued by the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange,
7

EARN = earnings, measured as net income deflated by the beginning market value
of common shares outstanding.
Model (1) is based on Easton and Harris (1991) who show a positive association between
stock return and earnings, suggesting that accounting information is useful for investment
decision-making. To evaluate the rating, we include DISQ and DISQ*EARN in the
model. The coefficient on DISQ reflects the relationship between stock return and the
rating, while the coefficient on DISQ*EARN reflects the effect of the rating on the
association between stock return and earnings. If the rating is credible and useful in
measuring corporate disclosure quality, we expect that firms with high rating will have
higher investment value and higher usefulness of accounting information. Thus, the
coefficients on DISQ and DISQ*EARN are both expected to be positive if the rating
really captures corporate disclosure quality. Based on Easton and Harris (1991), we
expect a positive coefficient on EARN.
Second, we run the following ordered logistic regression model to test our
hypotheses by controlling for other factors that may affect corporate disclosure quality:
DISQ = β0 + β1PRIVATE + β2CASHCTRL + β3PRIVATE *CASHCTRL + β4BDIND
+ β5 BDSIZE + β6 FSIZE + β7 ROE + β8 MB + Industry dummies + ε
(2)
where
PRIVATE = private control, coded “1” if firms are ultimately controlled by private
owners and “0” otherwise,
CASHCTRL = deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights, measured by the ratio of
cash-flow rights to control rights,
BDIND = board independence, measured as the proportion of independent directors
on the board,
BDSIZE = board size, measured as the number of directors on the board,
FSIZE =firm size, measured as the log of total assets,
ROE = return on equity, measured by the ratio of net income to common equity,
MB = market-to-book ratio, measured by the ratio of the market value of
common equity to the book value of common equity.
We include several control variables in model (2) based on the literature.9 Both
BDIND and BDSIZE are added in model (2) since extant studies (e.g., Klein, 2002;
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) suggest that board characteristics are associated with the
quality of financial reporting. In addition, we include other firm characteristics such as
FSIZE, ROE, and MB because prior research (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Khanna,
Palepu, and Srinivasan, 2004; Bamber and Cheon, 1998) finds that those characteristics
also affect corporate disclosure quality. To control for fixed industry effects, we also add
industry dummies for each industry from which there are at least 10 firms in the sample.
In model (2), we expect a negative and significant coefficient on PRIVATE if H1 is
supported. Since a high value of CASHCTRL indicates low divergence between cashflow rights and control rights, we expect a positive and significant coefficient on the
interaction term of PRIVATE and CASHCTRL if H2 is supported. We also expect a
positive coefficient on CASHCTRL (Haw et al., 2004). Based on prior research (e.g.,
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Khanna et al., 2004; Bamber
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and Cheon, 1998), we expect a positive coefficient on BDIND, BDSIZE, FSIZE, and
ROE, and a negative coefficient on MB.
6.

Empirical results

The sample selection begins by collecting corporate disclosure quality ratings of
listed firms for the fiscal year of 2005 from the official website of the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange (i.e., http://www.szse.cn). This yields a raw sample of 547 listed firms with
corporate disclosure quality data available for 2005. Next, we review 2005 annual
reports of the 547 firms from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange website to identify their
ultimate controllers, control rights, cash-flow rights, and board information. After
excluding firms that didn’t provide clear and complete information about ultimate
controllers or boards in their annual reports, the sample size is reduced to 461 firms. The
reduced sample is then merged with the Datastream database from which financial data
used in the analysis are collected. The final sample consists of 405 listed firms that meet
the requirement of data availability for computing control variables.
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the sample firms by industry. We find that our
sample involves 22 CSRC industries, of which machinery and equipment (15.80%),
petrochemical and plastics (12.84%), metal and nonmetal (9.63%), medicine and biology
(7.65%), information technology (6.67%), and wholesale and retail (6.17%) are the most
widely represented industries in the sample.
Table 1: Breakdown of sample firms by industry
CSRC Codes
A
C0
C1
C4
C5
C6
C7
C8
D
F
G
H
J
K
M
Others
Total

Industry Description
Agriculture, forestry, poultry, and fishing
Food and drink
Textile and clothing
Petrochemical and plastics
Electronics
Metal and nonmetal
Machinery and equipment
Medicine and biology
Utilities
Transportation and storage
Information technology
Wholesale and retail
Real estate
Social service
Conglomerate
22 industries
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Frequency
11
15
19
52
11
39
64
31
17
14
27
25
18
18
16
28
405

Percent (%)
2.72
3.70
4.69
12.84
2.72
9.63
15.80
7.65
4.20
3.46
6.67
6.17
4.44
4.44
3.95
6.91
100.00

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of variables. On average, corporate
disclosure quality of our sample firms is rated between “Good” and “Fair”. The mean
deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights is 0.742, which is tremendously close to
0.746, the mean deviation of a sample of 2,611 firms from the nine East Asian countries
reported in Claessens et al. (2000). About 28% of the sample firms are ultimately
controlled by private owners. Moreover, the mean board independence and board size
are 33.3% and 9, respectively.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable
DISQ
PRIVATE
CASHCTRL
BDIND
BDSIZE
FSIZE
ROE
MB

N
405
405
405
405
405
405
405
405

Mean
1.73
0.28
0.74
0.35
9.35
3.02
0.06
2.00

Median
2.00
0.00
1.00
0.33
9.00
2.98
0.05
1.68

Std
0.75
0.45
0.33
0.05
1.97
0.32
0.06
2.40

Q1
1.00
0.00
0.49
0.33
8.00
2.80
0.00
1.15

Q3
2.00
1.00
1.00
0.36
11.00
3.19
0.09
2.30

Notes: DISQ is corporate disclosure quality, coded “3”, “2”, “1”, and “0” for the quality rating of
“Excellent”, “Good”, “Fair”, and “Poor” issued by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, respectively. PRIVATE
is private control, coded “1” if firms are ultimately controlled by private owners and “0” otherwise.
CASHCTRL is deviation of cash flow rights from control rights, measured by the ratio of cash flow rights to
control rights. BDIND is board independence, measured as the proportion of independent directors on the
board. BDSIZE is board size, measured as the number of directors on the board. FSIZE is firm size,
measured as the log of total assets. ROE is return on equity, measured by the ratio of net income to
common equity. MB is market-to-book ratio, measured by the ratio of the market value of common equity
to the book value of common equity.

Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among variables. We find that
corporate disclosure quality is lower for firms ultimately controlled by private owners
(r=-0.15) and firms with high divergence between ownership and control (r=0.16).
Corporate disclosure quality is positively correlated with firm size and firm performance.
The deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights is higher for firms ultimately
controlled by private owners or for smaller firms. Smaller firms or higher growth firms
are more likely to have private ultimate controllers. Larger firms have larger board of
directors. The correlation between firm size and return on equity is 0.48. Other
correlation coefficients are all less than 0.48. Since correlations between independent
variables are not excessively high, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a substantive issue
in this study.
Table 4 includes the results of evaluating the credibility and usefulness of the rating.
Using the rating data over the period 2001 to 2005, we find positive and significant
coefficients for both DISQ (t-statistic = 2.94, p < .01) and DISQ*EARN (t-statistic = 4.92,
p < .01).10 These results suggest that firms with high ratings have better performance and

10

that their accounting information is more value relevant. Thus, the rating is credible and
useful in terms of capturing corporate disclosure quality.
Table 3: Pearson correlations
Variable
DISQ
PRIVATE
CASHCTRL
BDIND
BDSIZE
FSIZE
ROE

PRIVATE
-0.15***

CASHCTRL
0.16***
-0.44***

BDIND
0.03
0.09*
-0.02

BDSIZE
0.09*
-0.18***
0.14***
-0.22***

FSIZE
0.37***
-0.28***
0.18***
-0.03
0.18***

ROE
0.39***
0.06
0.03
0.02
0.09*
0.48***

MB
-0.02
0.15***
-0.10**
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.23***

Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively.

Table 4: Results on evaluating the rating
Variable
Intercept
DISQ
EARN
DISQ*EARN

Predicted sign
?
+
+
+

Coefficient
-0.23
0.02
0.62
0.41

N
F-statistic
Adj. R2

t-statistic
-20.48***
2.94***
5.32***
4.92***
2,098
107.05***
13.17%

Notes: We run the OLS regression, where the dependent variable is stock return, computed as the annual
stock return including dividends. DISQ is corporate disclosure quality, coded “3”, “2”, “1”, and “0” for the
quality rating of “Excellent”, “Good”, “Fair”, and “Poor” by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, respectively.
EARN is earnings, measured as net income deflated by the beginning market value of common shares
outstanding. *** indicates significance at the level of 1% (two-tailed).

Table 5 presents the results of the ordered logistic regression for testing the
hypotheses. We find that the coefficient on PRIVATE is negative and significant (χ2 =
4.09, p < .05), consistent with H1. The results show that corporate disclosure quality is
lower for firms ultimately controlled by private owners than for firms ultimately
controlled by the state. This suggests that private ultimate owners are more likely to
expropriate minority shareholders than the state. We also find a positive and significant
coefficient on the interaction of PRIVATE and CASHCTRL (χ2 = 2.82, p < .05), consistent
with H2. These results suggest that the negative effect of private ultimate ownership on
corporate disclosure quality is stronger for firms with large deviation of cash-flow rights
from control rights than for firms with small deviation of cash-flow rights from control
rights. Thus, it is important to examine the interaction effect of private ultimate
ownership and the separation of ownership and control on the expropriation of minority
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shareholders. Our findings imply that the agency issues arising from the expropriation by
private ultimate controllers are severer when firms’ cash-flow rights are highly detached
from their control rights.
Table 5: Results on testing the hypotheses
Variable
Intercept3
Intercept2
Intercept1
PRIVATE
CASHCTRL
PRIVATE*CASHCTRL
BDIND
BDSIZE
FSIZE
ROE
MB

Predicted sign
?
?
?
+
+
+
+
+
+
-

Coefficient
-8.73
-5.36
-3.07
-1.09
0.15
1.33
1.94
0.04
1.36
11.44
-0.06

χ2
27.90***
11.13***
3.68**
4.09**
0.13
2.82**
0.78
0.51
11.54***
32.16***
1.87*

Industry dummies

Included

N
LR statistic
-2 Log L

405
116.54***
782.73

Notes: We run the ordered logistic regression, where the dependent variable is corporate disclosure
quality, coded “3”, “2”, “1”, and “0” for the quality rating of “Excellent”, “Good”, “Fair”, and “Poor” by
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, respectively. The coefficient on PRIVATE is expected to be negative if
corporate disclosure quality is lower for firms ultimately controlled by private individuals than for firms
ultimately controlled by the state. The coefficient on PRIVATE*CASHCTRL is expected to be positive if
the negative effect of private ultimate ownership is weaker for firms with low deviation of cash-flow rights
from control rights than for firms with high deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively.

We include two board governance measures, namely, board independence and
board size, in the ordered logistic regression to examine the effect of board governance
on corporate disclosure quality. We are interested in this issue because La Porta et al.
(2000) suggest that weak investor protection leads to lower quality corporate governance
compared to countries with strong investor protection regimes. Board governance
mechanisms in weaker investor protection regimes like China may not be as effective as
those in stronger investor protection regimes. Consistent with our concern on Chinese
board governance, we find that corporate disclosure quality is not significantly associated
with either board independence or board size.
We also add three financial variables including firm size, return on equity, and
market-to-book ratio in the ordered logistic regression to control for the effects of other
firm characteristics on corporate disclosure quality. Larger firms usually have lower
12

disclosure costs and more transparent information environments than smaller firms. Like
Lang and Lundholm (1993), we document a positive association between corporate
disclosure quality and firm size (χ2 = 11.54, p < .01). Firms with better firm performance
may be more willing to disclose information. We find that corporate disclosure quality is
positively associated with firm performance (χ2 = 32.16, p < .01), consistent with prior
research (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Khanna et al., 2004). High growth firms may
be less willing to disclose information because proprietary information cost is higher for
those firms (Bamber and Cheon, 1998). As expected, we find a negative relationship
between corporate disclosure quality and market-to-book ratio, a proxy for growth
opportunities (χ2 = 1.87, p < .10).
In addition, we examine the effect of the deviation of cash-flow rights from control
rights on corporate disclosure quality for firms with private ultimate ownership and firms
with state ultimate ownership, respectively. We run the following ordered logistic
regression separately for each type of firms:
DISQ = β0 + β1CASHCTRL+ β2BDIND + β3 BDSIZE + β4 FSIZE + β5 ROE
+ β6 MB + Industry dummies + ε
(3)
We find that the coefficient on CASHCTRL in model (3) is positive and significant for
firms with private ultimate ownership (non-tabulated χ2 = 4.53, p < .05), while the
coefficient on CASHCRL is insignificant for firms with state ultimate ownership (nontabulated χ2 = 0.10). These results suggest that large divergence between ownership and
control leads to low corporate disclosure quality for firms with private ultimate
ownership, but not for firms with state ultimate ownership. This finding is consistent with
the notion that private ultimate owners are more likely to expropriate minority
shareholders than state ultimate owners, especially when cash-flow rights are highly
separated from control rights.
7.

Conclusion

This study examines whether private ultimate ownership negatively affects
corporate disclosure quality and whether the negative effect of private ultimate ownership
on corporate disclosure quality is moderated by the deviation of cash-flow rights from
control rights. Using a sample of 405 Chinese listed firms in 2005, we document a
negative association between corporate disclosure quality and private ultimate ownership.
We also find that corporate disclosure quality is more negatively associated with private
ultimate ownership when the deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights is large.
Our findings suggest that private ultimate owners are more likely to expropriate minority
shareholders and that corporate governance issues arising from private large
shareholdings are severer for firms with large divergence of ownership and control.
This study makes several contributions as follows. First, our study contributes to
the agency theory by examining the relationship between ultimate controllers’ type and
the expropriation of minority shareholders, and the moderating effect of the deviation of
cash-flow rights and control rights. Second, we extend the limited research on the effects
of minority shareholders’ expropriation on financial reporting quality by focusing on a
more comprehensive measure of financial reporting quality and associated corporate
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governance quality. Third, this study adds to the literature on corporate disclosure quality
by examining the association between corporate disclosure quality and the expropriation
of minority shareholders. Fourth, this study also provides empirical evidence on the
credibility and usefulness of the rating of corporate disclosure quality issued by the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
This study also provides some implications for public policy making. First, it may
be necessary to strengthen the governance role of minority shareholders, especially when
ultimate controllers are private owners and cash-flow rights are highly separated from
control rights, so that minority shareholders can effectively monitor controlling
shareholders to protect their interests. Second, since the expropriation of minority
shareholders by private ultimate controllers is magnified when ownership is highly
detached from control, it may be necessary to constrain the divergence between cashflow rights and control rights of the ultimate owners especially in countries with great
state-owned economy like China, which is increasingly privatizing state-controlled firms.
Third, it may be valuable for Chinese securities regulators or stock exchanges to
officially rate the corporate disclosure quality of Chinese listed companies.
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Endnotes:

1

Other firms include firms with state corporate block holders, private block holders, or foreign
block holders, among which state corporate block holders are also ultimately controlled by the
state.
2
The seven East Asian countries include Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.
3
The nine East Asian countries include Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. The thirteen Western European countries include
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
4
Jaggi, Leung, and Gul (2009) find that the monitoring effectiveness of independent
corporate boards is moderated in family-controlled firms.
5
The mean control rights and cash-flow rights of our sample firms are 40.11% and 30.20%,
respectively, which are greater than the 9 East Asia countries except for the cash-flow rights of
Thailand (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000).
6
Fan and Wong (2002) focus on seven countries’ data and earnings-return relation. A concern
on comparing earnings-return relation across countries is that stock prices are not equally
informative across countries (Bushman and Piotroski 2006). Haw et al. (2004) use 22 countries’
data and discretionary accruals to measure earnings management. Wysocki (2005) finds that
accrual quality is not an appropriate measure of earnings quality in non-U.S. countries. Likewise,
it is unclear whether the Jones model used for computing discretionary accruals perform equally
well across countries.
7
Prior studies identify ultimate owners by only using data limited for listed firms, which may
lead to measurement errors if the ultimate owner owns an unlisted firm who is the largest
shareholder of the downstream listed company (Haw et al. 2004).
8
Shanghai Stock Exchange, another Chinese stock exchange, does not assess the corporate
disclosure quality of its listed companies.
9
All continuous variables in the regression are winsorized at 1% and 99%.
10
We also estimate model (1) by using a dummy variable, which is coded “1” for the rating
of “Excellent” and “Good” and “0” otherwise. We find that the coefficients on DISQ and
DISQ*EARN are positive and significant (non-tabulated t-statistic = 2.12, p<.05, and t-statistic =
6.01, p<.01), similar to the results when DISQ is coded “3”, “2”, “1”, and “0” for the rating of
“Excellent”, “Good”, “Fair”, and “Poor”, respectively.
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